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From C. Bates (ed.), Community, Empire and Migration: South Asians in Diaspora, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 1-45 
 
 
Introduction: Community, Empire and Migration - Problems of 
Identity among South Asians in Diaspora 
 
Crispin Bates  
 
But are we not all refugees from something? … I was learning 
that human history is always a story of someone’s diaspora: a 
struggle between those who repel, expel or curtail – possess, 
divide and rule – and those who keep the flame alive from night 
to night, mouth to mouth, enlarging the world with each flick of 
a tongue.  [Romesh Gunesekera, Reef1] 
 
‘Communalism’ is a term used in India, but invented by colonial rulers in the nineteenth  
century, to refer to the use and manipulation of religious and/or ethnic differences for 
‘political’ ends antithetical to the national (or colonial) interest. It is related to, but very 
different from, the idea of ‘community’. The solidarity of communities, at a local level, 
have been an important feature of Indian society since ancient times [Stein, 1998]. 
‘Communalism’ however is predicated upon a non-local concept of community which 
developed, largely through political processes in the late colonial period. Arguably, the 
rise of ‘communalism’ was partly a reaction to the undermining of older, more local 
communities by rapid economic and social change. During the period of colonial 
occupation alternative outlets for popular unease and discontent included the Indian 
nationalist movement, but the division of this movement into Muslim, Hindu, Brahmin, 
non-Brahmin and other fractions, encouraged by the colonial power for strategic reasons, 
became a hall-mark of Indian politics and social life in the late colonial period, leading 
ultimately to Partition in 1947.  
 
The secularist consensus established in the early years after Independence for a while 
promised a new future for India, which became known as ‘the world’s largest 
democracy’. In Pakistan and Sri Lanka by contrast, consensus on a national identity 
proved more elusive, and in all three countries during the 1980s and 1990s, economic and 
political dislocation has brought about the return of ‘ethnic’ and ‘communal’ conflict 
with a vengeance. Sri Lanka has seen the emergence of a vicious civil war between 
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‘Tamil’ and ‘Sinhalese’ fractions of the population, intensified greatly after the pogrom 
of Tamil residents in the southern capital of Colombo in 1983. In Pakistan, civil war 
initially led to the division of the country in 1971, and the emergence of Bangladesh in 
the former eastern half, whilst more recently conflicts in the western half between ethnic 
groupings and political representatives, of Punjabis, Baluchi, Pathans, Sindhis and 
Muhajirs (especially the two latter fractions), often expressed through armed insurgency, 
has weakened governments and justified continuing interventions in politics by the 
Pakistani military. 
 
In India the decline of secularism, the decline of the Congress Party and the emergence of 
fundamentalist parties and organisations within India during the past decade has made 
communalism once more a prominent feature of life [Ludden 1990; Basu & 
Subramanyam 1996]. Communal conflicts in Assam, Punjab and Kashmir, exacerbated in 
the latter case by disputes with neighbouring Pakistan, have threatened not only the break 
up of the nation but even nuclear war. Communalism has also spread outwith the 
subcontinent, the political conflicts within India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka increasingly 
being found mirrored amongst the very substantial communities of Indians and Pakistanis 
living abroad.  
 
The links between community and communal conflict, and community and nation, are 
thus crucial in the recent history of the Indian subcontinent. How the twentieth century’s 
conception of community and contemporary ideas of communalism first came about 
though remains an issue of considerable controversy. To contemporary sociologists 
studying community or ‘race relations’ (as they used to be referred to) in the United 
States, the Caribbean, Africa, the U.K. or Indian Ocean States such as Mauritius, the 
issue is often treated as unproblematic. It is assumed that the identities of migrant 
communities, say Indian Hindus or Pakistani Muslims, male and female, are largely 
brought with them, and that they are based upon primordial and age-old forms of identity 
to be found in the Indian subcontinent. The conflicts between these ‘communities’, and 
the expression of gender and caste differences, are then often accepted as inevitable or 
natural, and only its articulation and the choice of methods for its management and 
amelioration remains a cause for concern. The international activities of militant political 
and religious organisations such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad or Jammia Islamia are 
likewise predicated upon this assumption, that the interests and identities of Hindus and 
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Muslims everywhere are essentially the same. When looked at more closely however, and 
in comparative perspective, it soon becomes apparent that this is not the case: that to ‘be 
a Hindu’ in Leicester, in England, for example, is very different from ‘being a Hindu’ in 
Durban South Africa, and that even within the subcontinent the identities of, for example, 
Muslims in Bombay, and those in Hyderabad, Lucknow or Bangladesh are very different 
from one another. Likewise, the boundaries of their ‘communities’ and their relations 
with their neighbours of other ‘communities’, and the political articulation of these 
relationships, can vary enormously. Sometimes it is the cause of violent conflict (as say 
in Kashmir or Sri Lanka), whilst otherwise these relationship apparently unrecognised as 
issue of contention at all, as in Mauritius, which sees itself as an island community, in 
which the majority of the population arrived as migrants from the Indian subcontinent, 
but in which none of the ‘communal’ differences and tensions of the home country have 
survived. The essays in this volume attempt to address the validity and substance of these 
claims and differences of perception. They further examine the divergent historical 
circumstances that have led to these various outcomes, and examples of the widely 
varying identities of migrant communities both within South Asia and those scattered 
beyond the subcontinent in the former territories of Britain’s colonial empire. 
 
Community and Empire 
 
Paul Brass and Asghar Ali Engineer are amongst many contemporary scholars keen to 
emphasis that ethnic identities are not primordial, arguing that ethnicity is never a given 
factor in identity formation but is always socially and politically constructed [Brass, 
1991; Engineer 1985]. According to Brass, competing elites draw upon, employ and even 
fabricate myths, symbols and other elements from indigenous societies in order to fashion 
a rhetoric that will mobilise populations in pursuit of collective and individual 
advantages. The process is characteristically seen in the mobilising activities of both 
Muslim and Hindu elites in north India the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
[McLane 1977; Robinson, 1974] as well as in Sri Lanka in the same period 
[Wickramasinghe, 1995; this volume]. The modern centralized State plays a crucial role 
in this process, creating an arena in which ethnic nationalism can flourish. Some have 
even argued that nationalism and racism, as well as communalism, are indissolubly 
linked, being part of the process by which modern capitalist economies manage and 
control their populations, respond to crises, and control the remuneration and size of the 
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work. ‘Racism is constantly emerging out of nationalism’ Etienne Balibar has written, 
‘not only towards the exterior but towards the interior… And nationalism emerges out of 
racism, in the sense that it would not constitute itself as the ideology of a ‘new’ nation if 
the official nationalism against which it were reacting were not so profoundly racist’ 
[Balibar, 1991, p. 53].  
 
In the colonial context, the inadequacy of democratic structures renders elite leadership 
all the more important, and efforts by the colonial power to avert the emergence of a 
united front amongst indigenous elites (the strategy of ‘divide and rule’), gave further 
encouragement to the emergence of a multiplicity of ethnic nationalisms. In Africa, the 
institutions of indirect rule were built upon an assumption by the colonial power that 
African society was already divided into such ethnic fractions, a theory which then 
frequently assumed the power of self-fulfillment. ‘Everywhere the local apparatus of the 
colonial state was organised on an ethnic or religious basis’ [Mamdani, 1996, p. 24]. By 
empowering certain specified loyal elites colonial regimes created a practical locus for 
political activity, even in acephalous west African communities where no such point of 
focus of power and loyalty had previously existed [Vail, ?? ; Lema, 1993].  
 
‘[A]partheid, usually considered unique to South Africa, is actually the generic 
form of the colonial state in Africa. As a form of rule, apartheid is what Smuts 
called institutional segregation, the British termed indirect rule, and the French 
association. It is this common state form that I call decentred despotism’ 
[Mamdani, 1996, p.8] 
 
A key basis for the division of indigenous sovereignty in Africa was the idea of 
customary law. Land rights everywhere, for example, were treated as collective rather 
than individual and every colony had two legal systems, one modern and the other 
customary, to uphold these rights. Power in customary affairs was then vested in local 
‘Native Authorities’, composed of a hierarchy of ‘chiefs’. The consequence of this 
system was a proliferation of representative authorities and their dependent communities, 
creating enormous obstacles to the mobilisation of the population against colonial rule. 
The anti-colonial struggle, when it did erupt, was then often in its earliest stages directed 




In India, a similar phenomenon can be observed. Caste, tribe and Indian aristocracy were 
here the bulwarks of customary rule, with zamindars and other feudal elites being 
invested with unusual powers, a separation of public and private law being enforced (with 
religious precepts being the foundation of the former), and the use of caste and tribe as 
instruments of imperial management and control  through enactments such as the 
criminal tribes legislation of the 1870s [Robb, 1996; Nigam 1990, Cohn, 1983]. But 
divisions were not only promoted willfully by the colonial government. Class played an 
important role too in generating rivalry and conflict out of social and religious 
differences.  Thus not only nationalism, but rapid economic change in the late nineteenth 
century played a part in the emergence of rival caste associations, and revivalist and 
reform movements amongst both Hindus and Muslims [Pandey, 1990, pp.  ??]. In 1909, 
1918 and 1935 the British began to exploit these movements and the conflicts that 
sometimes resulted from them by institutionalising so-called communal differences in 
successive extensions of the franchise.  Separate electorates were created for Hindus, 
Muslims, Untouchables and Adivasis, making it very difficult for nationalist politicians 
to unify these sections of society in the struggle against colonialism.  So successful was 
the British policy that it took forty years of struggle before India finally won 
independence and in the final denouement it was only then possible with the partition of 
the subcontinent into a Hindu majority India and a Muslim majority Pakistan. 
 
British policies in this period though were not entirely strategic and cynical, as might be 
assumed. As in the African case, they were built upon a highly developed epistemology 
and body of knowledge. Amongst these ideas resulting were the Aryan race theories of 
nineteenth century orientalists, and related developments in physical anthropology and 
linguistics at the end of that century [Bates, 1996; Cohn, 1996; Said, 1993]  By such 
means the colonial gaze hierarchically arranged subject peoples into groups according to 
their origins and physical characteristics. The conclusions of these studies upheld in 
every case, what Partha Chatterjee has referred to as ‘the rule of colonial difference’ 
[Chatterjee P. 1997]. Central was the belief that whilst European values, rights and reason 
were Universally applicable, enabling the European to know, and to govern, the 
colonised countries of Africa and Asia, this same apparatus of knowledge also affirmed 
the exceptional nature of these societies and their constituent populations. ‘One of the 
fundamental elements in the colonial conception of India as a “different” society was the 
fixed belief that the population was a mélange of communities’ [Chatterjee, P. 1997, p. 
6 
223]. As a consequence, it was argued, while certain European legal principles and 
administrative procedures could be applied, others (such as representative democracy) 
could not, or only in specially adapted forms. 
 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century race and the idea of racial difference, 
together with their constituent elements, the supposedly wholly endogamous castes and 
tribes of Africa and Asia,  were generally the most important elements in colonial 
understanding and administrative arrangements. But as race theories were undermined by 
scientific scepticism, facilitated by the end of slavery, global migration, and the later 
genocidal conflicts in Europe, new ideas of culture and ethnicity came to take their place.  
Modernisation, or the lack of it, was one reason for the slowness of colonial regimes to 
give up control. Colonial government as development administration became the fashion, 
beginning with schemes of imperial preference in the 1930s, but most particularly after 
World War Two. The lack of appropriate institutions, both of civil and political society, 
was another excuse often advanced for the absence of democracy, and so it was that 
rights and liberties came to be given only in stages and in varying degrees throughout the 
colonial empires from the 1900s onwards. Curiously therefore, while British legal 
principles, such as habeas corpus, were declared as universal rights, and Westminster, 
‘the mother of all Parliaments’ was upheld as the model for all to follow, very few parts 
of the British empire enjoyed the benefits of these gifts, and for the most part only those 
in which white settlers were a majority of the population (Canada and Australia) [Tinker, 
1976]. Rules of colonial difference thus persisted, the colonised societies were regarded 
as throw-backs to an extinct European past, and as soon race theories explaining this 
phenomenon abated, new sociological ideas arose to take their place and to justify the 
separate and unequal treatment of imperial subjects. Foremost amongst these was the 
notion of the ‘Plural Society’. First fashioned to justify and explain Dutch policy in the 
colony of Indonesia [Furnivall, 1945], the theory was developed and extended, to Africa 
and the Caribbean [Smith 1965; Kuper & Smith ??], and many other situations, although 
uncommonly so in the metropolitan societies of the West until at least the end of the 
twentieth century. Typically, the theory presented ‘developing’ colonial societies as the 
mirror image of the West. Western societies were seen as organic and unified, consensual 
normative systems in the words of Talcott Parsons, with highly developed institutions of  
civil and political society and a common value system.  
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Unities of course can only be understood by contrasting them with their opposites, and 
the ‘Other’ in the theory of Plural Societies was located more often than not in the Africa 
and Asia. Here ‘developing’ societies were depicted as fractured into their constitutive 
social elements, their various societies or communities living side by side in economic 
symbiosis but mutual avoidance, the only unity being that imposed by the colonial 
powers. The plural society was ‘a unit of disparate parts’, owing its existence to external 
factors, and ‘lacking a common social will’ [Smith, 1965, p.vii] . This then gave the 
colonial government an important role not only in maintaining order, but in arbitrating 
these differences. Rather than leave the matter to democracy, the law, and majority rule 
(as in the United Kingdom), or the same, plus a constitution and a bill of rights (as in the 
United States), or any other number of possible solutions, colonial governments took 
upon themselves the responsibility of balancing the interests of what they perceived to be 
the various fractions within the population. Hence the policy of separate representation 
for different religious or ethnic communities, and the institutionalisation of procedures 
for consultation with ‘community leaders’ in legislative councils and local authorities, 
rather than effective, representative self-government (a practice followed to this day in 
the U.K.2). At independence, countries as diverse as India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Cyprus 
and Fiji, were then left with constitutions which enshrined this idea, these constitutions 
remaining in force for a considerable time with little modification, in some cases, such as 
Mauritius, almost unchanged to this day. As with the policies of indirect rule in Africa, 
constitutions enshrining the idea of a ‘plural society’ frequently created the very social 
atomism and rivalry which they sought to contain. And when competition and rivalry 
erupt into violence this creates a further sense of distance and the process of division is 
complete [Tambiah 1996].  
 
There is always of course a psychological element, and the outcome of colonial policies 
of divide and rule were never as predictable as the above narrative suggests. The process 
of decolonisation was also an exercise in voluntarism, in which colonial subjects 
exercised agency and attempted to undermine the hegemony of colonial power and 
colonial ideas of order and social relationship. Our view of post-colonial identity, 
however, is still very largely borrowed from Benedict Anderson [1991], whose path-
breaking study of nationalism established a framework of analysis that has been widely 
influential and largely followed ever since. The problem with the Andersonian 
framework is that it too closely resembles the colonial conditions which it contemplates. 
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Implicitly Anderson assumes that capitalism and empire are global phenomenon which 
reproduce themselves in a predictable fashion and with largely predictable consequences. 
Third World nationalism therefore can all too easily be seen as a mere imitation of, or 
reaction to, the precedents set in the first industrial societies and imperial nations of 
Europe. In one way or another European experience over determines all, and the 
possibility of truly ‘postcolonial’ expressions of community and nation are largely over 
ruled. The outcome is an image of third world nationalism not far removed from the 
framework set for it by the British Montague-Chelmsford reforms in India as far back as 
1918. In the case of India this leaves us stuck with conceptions of caste, tribe and 
religious community inherited from the days of the Raj, as if no other possibility of 
existence existed and as if Indian sociology had not advanced one jot in more than a 
century (some would say even for a thousand years). 
 
Dissatisfaction with current thinking on the idea of community has been expressed by a 
number of South Asian anthropologists, historians and political scientists: these include 
Bernard Cohn [1987] and Ronald Inden [1990] who have applied historical insights to 
their critique of the social categories Indian anthropology; Ranajit Guha in his 
reinterpretation of the meanings of peasant communities in Elementary Aspects [1983]; 
and Partha Chatterjee [1997], in his critique of contemporary theorisation of the 
formation of national identities from a third world perspective. It is undoubtedly a 
mistake to overly concentrate on the superficial articulations of the political process, as 
Chatterjee argues, and in his critique of Anderson: 
 
 'If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community 
from certain "modular" forms already made available to them by Europe and the 
Americas, what do they have left to imagine?' [Chatterjee 1997, p. 5].  
 
Similar anxieties are shared by the contributors to this volume, most notably by John 
Kelly, with whose essay this volume opens. Partha Chatterjee’s The Nation and its 
Fragments has been to date perhaps the most influential of these authors. Whilst some  
might differ from aspects of Chatterjee’s narration of South Asian history, and others 
may balk, for example, at his interpretation of jati as the building block of Indian society, 
there can be few who will dispute his honest plea for ‘fuzzier’ thinking on the issue of 
community that might avoid the crude conjunction of ethnicity, state and nation that 
characterises much of present-day theorisation on the subject. In particular, as Kelly 
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stresses, the Andersonian idea of a nation, as a single community, imagining itself to 
monopolise a social space, representing itself to itself and to others, is an exceptional 
form of nationalism rather than the norm, and is something we need to get away from in 
our thinking about community and identity 
 
Community and Migration 
 
Migration is sometimes put forward as being amongst the fundamental causes of 
communalism: leading to the 'mixing' of naturally exclusive communities which might 
not otherwise normally be found in such close proximity to one another [see for example 
Weiner, 1988]. Such a view depends however upon a typically essentialised view of 
South Asian communities, and it might alternatively be argued that if migration is indeed 
a determining factor this may be simply because dislocation promotes insecurity. This 
perhaps explains why those who have moved furthest from India - those South Asians 
living in Europe North America for example, who have been extensively studied - often 
appear historically to have been most politicised and defensive of their identities, even to 
the point of violence. Examples include the Ghadrites in Canada and the U.S.A. in the 
1900s and the Indian community in South Africa, which was the first to mobilise against 
colonial rule under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.3 These same communities are 
more prosperous than those they have left behind in India and sometimes more 
prosperous that those amongst whom they live, which tends to undermine the simplistic 
explanation of ‘communalism’ as class conflict writ large (though economics often enters 
into it). However, such communities of Indians abroad are beleaguered in other senses - 
being numerically in a minority and culturally marginalised in the societies in which they 
live, as well as perhaps being forced more often on a daily basis to face the extremes of 
‘white’ racism. Within the Indian Ocean region though, communities of migrant Indians 
are to be found numerically and culturally in a majority, or at least in significant 
numbers, such as in Mauritius and Sri Lanka. Both societies are prosperous. Quite why 
then communal conflict should erupt in one and not in the other remains a paradox.  
 
Even closer to the Hindu heartland of north India, in cities like Calcutta and Bhopal, 
migrant communities are sometimes able to integrate seamlessly into the societies in 
which they are placed. At other times they apparently suffer irreconcilable differences 
with their neighbours from whom they are religiously, culturally or ethnically distanced. 
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By focusing on the issue of migrancy as a factor, insights may be gained into the genesis 
of communal conflict. In the process, it is important that attention is also paid to the many 
cases in which migrant identities have developed in the absence of rivalry and conflict, 
and where new non-confrontational, and sometimes syncretic. traditions have emerged. 
 
Issues of identity amongst migrant South Asians have perhaps been most thoroughly 
addressed in the metropole of the former British empire – the United Kingdom. The U.K. 
contains one of largest communities of South Asians living abroad in the developed world, 
and it has been the subject of considerable sociological interest [Clarke 1991, Ballard 
1995]. Discussion has usually taken place within the framework of so-called ‘race’ 
relations., but it has more lately broadened out to address a variety of other issues, 
including health, marriage, housing, gender and employment. Studies  of identity amongst 
migrant South Asian communities elsewhere however are few and far between. There are 
moves towards this in R. K. Jain [1993] and in Robin Cohen’s recent Global Diasporas, 
[1997], but perhaps the only genuinely comparative and interdisciplinary attempt has been 
the outcome of conference organised in Pennsylvania University by Peter Van der Veer 
[1995].  Migrancy and migrant identities within the Indian subcontinent are yet poorly 
addressed, whilst studies of the Indian communities in the Caribbean, Mauritius, Fiji and 
Africa, have invariably tended to focus on the economic dimension: the nature of 
plantation economies and the various systems if indenture or trade which brought them 
there in the first place [e.g. Daniel V. et al 1992]. 
 
The interconnectedness between the labour markets of developing economies and those of 
the developed world has, nonetheless, long been the focus of interest amongst both 
sociologists and historians of Africa, Asia and Latin America. A pioneer in what since 
became known as the field of ‘new’ international labour studies was  Robin Cohen. His 
book Peasants and Proletarians: the struggles of Third World Workers, co-authored with 
Gutkind and Brazier and published in 1979, set the trend for much that followed. Path-
breaking in its linkage of contemporary class struggles in the third world with long-term 
historical trends, the focus was nonetheless on the processes which have affected the 
mobility of capital and labour internationally, and rather less on the ways in which 
workers participated actively in the shaping of their destinies and the cultural, and political 
consequences of these migrant labour movements.4  
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Initially the field of migration studies was dominated by contemporary sociologists of 
labour in the developing world. There has since been a greater convergence between the 
two disciplines involved in this enterprise - history and sociology. However, the historians 
have typically addressed migration as a symptom of economic change, and said very little 
or nothing at all about the problems of ethnicity and the changing identity of migrants that 
have resulted over time. The interest of Sociologists in migration, on the other hand, if not 
concerned with the economics of the phenomenon, largely revolved around the problems 
of 'Race relations' within Western economies which have been the final destination of 
migrant streams. They have neglected the far greater movements of people that have gone 
on within the developing world, and have concentrated on problems of identity as they 
have emerged through the relationships between immigrant communities and their 'white' 
neighbours, ignoring the tensions that exist for example between Sunni and Shia Muslims, 
between Muslims and Hindus, between high caste and low caste Hindus, and between 
Africans and Asians, and only exceptionally of late [Wilson 1987], have they begun to 
address the issue of gender (a dimension within which in all fields adequate research is 
still lacking). 
 
Robert Miles in Capitalism and Unfree Labour [1987] neatly inverted the traditional 
concerns of the Race Relations industry, by arguing that racial and ethnic conflict was not 
a side-effect of international migration, but a fundamental characteristic, especially where 
unequal contracts such as the indenture contract (which prevent the free operation of 
market forces) are in use. Even Miles' study however failed to make adequate use of 
international comparisons. Like others, his primary concern is with migration from the 
developing world to the developed, and little attention is paid to the occurrence of similar 
tensions resulting from migration streams within the developing world itself and the 
examples and exceptions thereby presented.  
 
This book attempts to begin to fill these gaps by asking a wide range of experts in the field 
of migration studies, both historians and anthropologists, all of them engaged in new 
research in the field, to focus, not on the economic causes and effects of migration 
streams, but on the problems of identity, ethnic conflict and the changing self-
identification of migrants that have resulted. The studies themselves are all drawn from 
atypical contexts, most often from locations within the developing world, from places 
such as East Africa, Sri Lanka and Fiji. The hope thereby is to throw new light on 
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problems of identity and ethnic conflict amongst migrant communities, by drawing upon 
international comparisons and by combining both anthropological and historical 
perspectives.  
 
Migrant cultures and ‘Postcolonial’ identities 
 
A consistent conclusion, noticed in the work of contributors to this volume, concerns the 
apparent adaptability of migrant communities and the ease with which their identities have 
often integrated or otherwise transformed to meet the pressures of different circumstances 
- a possibly optimistic outcome in an era where identities, particularly religious identities, 
are increasingly regarded as intransigent and irreconcilable with one another. John Kelly 
in his contribution brings this theme very much to the fore, by charting the history of 
Fijian migrant identity from ‘coolie’ to ‘Indian’, and the resistance of Indian population to 
the communal space carved out for them by the British. Kelly does this in an unusual way, 
seeking to challenge the normative assumption that third world identities must be either in 
imitation or reaction to European exemplars, whilst urging the case for a more complex, 
‘post-Andersonian’ perspective on the nature of communities. 
 
As Kelly explains, Fiji became a British colony in 1874 when leading Fijian chiefs signed 
a deed of cession. But they were soon though threatened with becoming a minority in their 
own island, since Fiji’s migrant Indians accounted for 46% of the population by 1946. 
Most arrived under indenture contracts to meet the needs of the island’s burgeoning sugar 
industry. The Fijian indentured labourers were described as ‘coolies’ by the British, but 
referred to themselves as girmitiyas, from the word ‘girmit’ or agreement, referring to the 
indenture contract5. From the very beginning ethnic Fijian and Indian populations were 
spatially separated, a practice commonly followed in British colonies, ostensibly to 
manage, but in practice more often affirming colonial preconceptions of racial difference. 
After 1936 Fijian and Indian ‘communities’ were also differentially represented 
politically, as the administration included members from the ‘Indian’ community within a 
limited programme of self-government, in an effort to encourage continue Indian 
immigration following the abolition of indenture in 1910. This had been against the 
wishes of the short-lived Fiji Indian National Congress, who wanted a ‘common roll’, 
regardless of race, an idea that was opposed by London, until they began to fear the 
possibility of a break-away by the white settlers in Fiji, as they were already experiencing 
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in Kenya, at which point the notion suddenly gained support. Ultimately though the 
common roll idea was abandoned and the typical colonial fashion of representation by 
community was adopted, with five Fijian chiefs in the legislature, against three elected 
‘Europeans’, three elected ‘Indians’, plus two additional officially appointed 
representatives for the Indians and another two officially appointed representatives for the 
Europeans – thus creating a highly undemocratic ‘balance’ that would nonetheless favour 
colonial interests. 
 
Unionisation of the sugar workers soon followed, and this, together with growing size of 
the migrant community created a sense of unease amongst native Fijians who sought to 
re-assert communal separation and their constitutional preponderance, as they saw it, 
according to the terms of the Deed of Cession. These anxieties culminated after the 
outbreak of World War II when the Fijian chiefs re-affirmed their loyalty, and partnership 
with the colonial government, by offering recruits to fight in Africa or Egypt, whilst the 
Indians engaged in strike action against the Australian monopsony sugar milling 
company, CSR. The British declared sugar to be an essential war-time commodity, and 
the scene was set for a confrontation that surprisingly however, never took place. After a 
heated debate, the Central Indian War Committee refused to condemn the War (unlike the 
Indian National Congress in India), and when called upon by the government to organise 
a volunteer labour corps, voted to disband itself rather than either back or confront the 
government. At the same time A.D. Patel (‘the Fijian Gandhi’) and Swami Rudrananda, 
who led the growers strike, refused to accept the role of representing Indian interests 
versus those of the Fijians and the colonial government. Patel offered instead to gift the 
sugar cane harvested by the growers to the government, rather than accept the status quo, 
in which Indian prices were controlled and Indian small holders were remunerated at 
derisively low rates by the CSR. And when this gift was rejected, rather than provoke 
further confrontation, Patel and Swami Rudrananda, simply ordered their followers back 
to work.  
 
The situation completely contrasted that in India, where defiance of the colonial 
government and conflict with its communal allies was the hall-mark of Indian 
nationalism in the 1940s. Kelly explains this by arguing that the indentured migrants, did 
not generally think of themselves as ‘Indians’ before they arrived in Fiji. Oral evidence 
suggests that caste and even religious identification was extremely uneven from one 
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sugar estate to the next. ‘These “Indians” were not only not “Indians” in self-conception 
upon arrival; they learned additional, new dimensions of social connection and difference 
from the indenture experience itself.’ Their identities were thus numerous and 
overlapping and did not allow them to fall easily into the stereotyped roles cast for them 
either by British or Fijian politicians. Ultimately however the separation of communities 
was reinforced through the 1946 Deed of Cession debates in the Fijian Legislative 
Council, the terms of which have framed every constitutional debate and amendment in 
Fiji ever since. The ethnic Fijian chiefs further overhauled the ‘Native Regulations” in 
1944, tying the indigenous or ethnic Fijians more tightly than ever to their natal villages. 
These separations, ethnic, spatial and constitutional, were maintained against the wishes 
of Indian representatives, who chose the path of inaction, rather than assert a unified 
‘Indian’ identity and allow it precedence over all others.  
 
‘In the face of flat government refusal to discuss equity, in the face of a Government 
using the war emergency to introduce new, newly naked codes of racial difference 
in wages, the Indo-Fijian simply refused to represent themselves, if representing 
themselves meant accepting and extending the organization of a fixed racial 
position.’  
 
Kelly implies that the Indo-Fijians were moving at the time, and have presumably 
continued to do so since, towards a new form of ‘postcolonial’ identity. This is not a 
hybrid identity of the sort described by some Caribbean historians, which involves an 
element of synthesising and progressivist teleology, but an identity located outside the 
framework of colonial discourse, somewhere akin to the ‘the third space’ described by 
Homi Bhabha [19??], or the concept of ‘the Void’ suggested by the Caribbean critic 
Wilson Harris [Harris 19??; Moore-Gilbert 1997, p.183].  Kelly emphasises however that 
this identity was not an merely attempt by Indo-Fijians to represent themselves, in a 
Saidian symbolic, semiotic sense (which fits too easily with Anderson’s modernisation 
theory of the origins of the nation state), ‘but to seek leverage and varieties of alternative, 
the paths that really scared the Europeans’. Far from being a ‘teeming’ horde determined 
to ‘take over’ Fiji, as they were depicted, Indo-Fijians were in practice highly ambivalent 
about their role, and as uncomfortable with the place created for them by the colonial 
power as they were with the identities imported by Arya Samajists and others from India. 
As Kelly puts it ‘if we really want to study the whole politics of imagined community, we 
should also study attempts to evade its impositions’, and he finds evidence for this in the 
Fijian case where he argues that a constant in the history of the ‘Indian Problem’ is the 
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effort ‘to move away from a colonial hierarchy of peoples, efforts in the first place not to 
be the “Indians” of the British imagination’. 
 
Kelly thus demonstrates that an important role was played at a certain level by politics, 
and by British policies, in the development of Indo-Fijian identity, but he also argues that 
this identity was elective, that Fijian Indians could assert their agency and choose not to 
accept the political and social role carved out for them by the British, indeed, to reject a 
political role altogether when one acceptable to them could not be achieved. Clear 
parallels are to be seen here with the periodic attempts at collaboration between South 
African Indians and Africans described by Ravi Thiara (see below), despite the pressures 
from government, and the historical traditions suggesting otherwise. This view of Fijian 
identities is thoroughly historicised, and is hardly the root-less post-modern construction 
that Ari Nave alleges it to be. By contrast Ari Nave, in his essay in this volume, whilst 
insisting that History has played its part in the creation of Mauritian identities, does not 
describe this process in any detail. Instead, the definition of the communities given in the 
British-designed constitution are presented as a more or less accurate representation of 
communal differences, and it is then explained in a largely synchronic fashion, and with 
reference to game theory, why it is to the advantage of communities so-defined to 
continue operate within these limits. Nave’s account concentrates on the achievement of 
ends by social actors, and why they should aim towards consensus in doing so, but it 
remains to be explained how the social boundaries of Mauritius came into existence in 
the first place, and how they came to be accepted here without, apparently, much in the 
way of controversy and debate, and not so elsewhere. The chapter concludes with a few 
clues, whilst admitting it is still something of a quandary as why Mauritius should remain 
relatively harmonious, even with the help of its peculiar constitutional arrangements.  
 
A notable curiosity of Mauritian society is that while the island is apparently divided on 
ethnic and religious grounds, the supposedly ‘Hindu’ fraction of the population has a 
great number of original customs and practices (some of them syncretic), quite different 
from those seen in the Indian subcontinent, with whom otherwise links and 
commonalities are considered so important6. The so-called ‘castes’ in Mauritius in 
particular are quite unrecognisable from a sub-continental perspective, and apparently 
often lump together a mutually antagonistic castes from an Indian setting into a single 
group.  Thus, by contrast with India, Rajputs are seen as low caste, the title having been 
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usurped by former low caste Bihari immigrants in the nineteenth  century. The terms 
Hindu and 'Indiane' refer exclusively to north Indian Hindus. Migrants from Tamilnad 
call themselves Tamils and never identify themselves as ‘Hindus'. Many other so-called 
castes too, such as the ‘Bengali’ derive solely from a linguistic or regional association, as 
do the 'Marathis'. Gujaratis are also seen as a separate community, whilst the former 
Brahmin elite are referred to as the ‘Marars’ and lack the pre-eminence they might be 
expected to enjoy from an Indian perspective. 
 
The Vaish, otherwise known as ‘the Babujis’ (who see themselves as Kshatriyas), are the 
largest and most influential caste group on the island. Internally the group is divided into 
Koeri, Kurmi, Kahar, Ahir, Lohar jatis, the first four being the most important. No-one 
apparently will describe themselves as 'low caste' or sudra (by contrast with India), 
although the term Chamar might sometimes be used to describe others. In the past many 
admitted to Chamar status (as shown by historical records), but recently this seems to 
have become completely taboo. An explanation may lie in the rapid economic growth of 
the past twenty years, as well as the lack of positive discrimination measures of the sort 
seen in India (There are obvious parallels here with the well documented Sanskritisation 
movements in prosperous commercial regions of India in the recent past.) 
 
Mauritian Muslims, by contrast with the ‘Hindus’, will often not admit to coming from 
India at all, connecting instead with a broader Islamic identification, whilst Tamils who 
came as slaves or skilled free labourers in the eighteenth century today see themselves as 
Christians and will only marry other Christians. Only the creoles apparently are lacking 
in prohibitions about marrying people of mixed origins. 
 
Because of their numerical preponderance, the Prime-minister has so far always been a 
Vaish. All ‘communities’ though are represented in the cabinet, even if a majority of 
supporters in the different parties are simply Vaish. Whatever their formal constituency 
every political party makes a point of inducting Vaish members at some point, whilst the 
main Hindu parties all have to be led by Vaish if they are to stand any chance of electoral 
success. By one means or another, therefore, the majority community asserts its influence 
and control, even if formally the constitution attempts to effect a balance between their 
interests and those of other groups, and privately this is often resented. 
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A possible future that could have overcome Mauritius is to be seen in the case of Sri 
Lanka. Here ethnic divisions defined and imposed in a constitutional settlement by the 
British in the process of decolonisation were initially accepted, but they went on to 
become a source of intense controversy and conflict. Nave rather implies, in keeping with 
the description of the Mauritian tourist authority, that such conflict does not exist in 
Mauritius. But there certainly have been periods of serious disharmony in Mauritian 
society in the twentieth century, beginning with rivalry between the elite Franco-
Mauritian Parti de l’Ordre and the first creole/Indo-Mauritian party, L’Action Liberale at 
the beginning of the century, which campaigned for an improvement in conditions for the 
labourers on sugar plantations. Other measures proposed by a Royal Commission in 
1909, including the ending of indenture and the introduction of income tax, were 
vigorously opposed by the Franco-Mauritian elite, and riots and incidents of sabotage 
occurred during the course of the elections in 1911 (held on an extremely limited 
franchise).  
 
The response of the British colonial government, as in India, was to manage popular 
demands through a strictly limited system of representation according to enumerated 
communities, with elected members being outnumbered by officials and official 
nominees in the island’s legislative council. Thus in the early 1930s when the constitution 
of the island was remodeled in response to unrest provoked primarily by the depression 
the Council of Government still had eight ex-officio members, only ten elected members, 
and nine nominated members, including six non officials. Unsurprisingly this reform did 
little to placate popular unrest and in 1936 the Labour Party was founded by Dr. Maurice 
Curé to address the problems of the island’s labourers and which, along with the 
Independent Forward Bloc, founded by Sookdeo Bissoondoyal in 1958, began the 
campaign for independence. The Parti Mauricien Social Democrate (PMSD) represented 
the Franco-Mauritians, but began also to recruit ‘Coloured creole’ members out of fear of 
the growing power of the Labour Party. Although the island’s assembly had a majority of 
elected representatives (nineteen) by 1948, and the vote had been extended to every 
literate member of the population, there were still three official members and twelve 
nominees by the colonial government, representing the various ‘communities’, as defined 
by the colonial administration. Unsurprisingly, the continuation of this system meant that 
representation by community, even after the advent of party politics, became the accepted 
political practice in Mauritius. The absence of a Muslim member in 1948 thus led to a 
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campaign for the election of a Muslim candidate, which succeeded in 1953 with the 
election of Abdool Razack Mohamed, who set up the Comité d’Action Musulman to 
agitate for constitutional reform to ‘safeguard’ the interests of Muslims – to which 
unsurprisingly the government acceded. Simultaneously, the All-Mauritius Hindu 
Congress was formed to uphold the ‘interests’ of the island’s Hindu population 
[Mannick, 1989]. 
 
Rather late in the day the proposal was made in 1957 at a constitutional conference in 
London that representation should not be on the grounds of race or religion, but solely on 
the basis of party and principal. This idea though was abandoned and the island was 
divided in 1958 into forty single member constituencies, elected on a crude first past the 
post basis, with the Governor appointing twelve additional members to the Legislative 
Council in proportion to the ‘communities’ in the electorate (including one for the 
Muslims) who had failed to achieve representation. In 1964, the Legislative Council was 
renamed the Legislative Assembly and Executive Council was renamed the Council of 
Ministers, and took over responsibility for the day to day management of the colony from 
the British governor. Dissent continued however with the PMSD opposing independence 
and running a virulent campaign against what they depicted as the danger of ‘Hindu 
domination’. This led ultimately to a series of clashes at Trois Boutiques between Hindus 
and creole PMSD members and a state of emergency on the island was declared 
immediately prior to independence in 1968.  
 
The electoral process ultimately adopted, with three members per constituency elected on 
the British first past the post system, combined with a distribution of seats to the ‘best 
losers’ from parties representing ‘communities’ that had failed to win a place, established 
the system of representation still in place today. And it was only the experience of violent 
confrontation that persuaded the PMSD under the leadership of Gaetan Duval to drop its 
communalist stance (although the party split on the issue) and to seek an alliance with the 
Labour Party following independence. Arguably, even then, it was mainly the subsequent 
rise of a serious common enemy in the Marxist and highly popular trade union based 
Mouvement Militant Mauricien (founded by Paul Bérenger in 1969), and the ideology of 
MMM itself, that helped keep the communal peace thereafter. 
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We know from Scott [1985], that social and political conflict need not present itself in 
organised, violent or insurrectionary forms, but can still be significant. Arguably what 
has happened in Mauritius since 1968 is that since a formal accord has been arrived at to 
keep it at bay in the political sphere, communal conflict has simply been driven 
underground and into the small scale rivalries of day to day life. Small-scale examples of 
this are to be found in the Cola Wars and the so-called ‘loup-garou’ (werewolf) 
controversy of the late 1980s. Competition between soft drink manufacturers is common 
the world over, but in Mauritius the Pepsi franchise is owned by the Muslim Gujarati 
Currimjee family, and as a result many Muslim retail outlets sell only Pepsi and at 
Muslim functions only Pepsi is served. Biryanis (a traditional Muslim dish), it is said, 
‘goes best with Pepsi’, which thus has a unique place in the commensal rites of this 
community. Even Middle class Hindus are aware of this, although they would deny that 
this was a reason for their not drinking Pepsi since that would be 'communal'. They just 
say it ‘tastes bad’, and disparage its use. The Coca-Cola franchise, by contrast, is owned 
by a Hindu family and is distributed in all Hindu retail outlets and is the preferred 
carbonated soft drink of this community. In their daily lives therefore Hindus and 
Muslims on the island know by their constitution that they belong to different fractions of 
society, and whilst prevented from doing so in Parliament, they act out a communal 
conflict in trivial aspects of their daily lives. Such differences only assume more serious 
proportions when there is an apparent threat to livelihood or life and limb. In the wake of 
cyclone Hollanda in February/March 1994 such a threat existed, as while 
communications were disrupted and the island was without electricity for several weeks, 
there were a spate of robberies and violent assaults . As it became apparent that the police 
were unable (or, allegedly, unwilling), to apprehend the perpetrator, the rumour spread 
that a loup-garous, or werewolf, going by the name of Touni-Minuit, was on the loose: 
apparently a respectable member of the community by day, but perpetuating terrible 
crimes under the cover of darkness. Mistrustful of the authorities, armed groups of 
Muslim vigilantes were formed to patrol the streets in Muslim majority precincts, which 
for a while became no-go areas for local Hindus. The rumour died out only  when the 
‘loup-garous’  started telephoning people late at night to warn them they were coming, 
and the tabloid newspapers found a new set of stories to occupy them. 
 
Contrary to the example of Hosay in the Caribbean, as described by Mohapatra [1996?], 
the communal divide in Mauritius is further evident in the exclusive disposition of 
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religious festivals: although they celebrate diwali and holi, for Tamils ‘their’ main 
festival is Taipoosam Cavadee. Like the Marathas in India the so-called 'Marathis' of 
Mauritius concentrate on celebrating the festival of Ganesh Chaturti (?), the Telugus shun 
this occasion (even though Ganesh is a god to all Hindus) and celebrate Ougadi, while the 
Chinese confine their celebrations to the New Year and the Christians to toussaint (all 
saints day), the Muslims celebrating id. All have been recognised as public holidays and 
prominent politicians make a point of attending them all (as in India) in order to advertise 
their lack of favouritsm, at least in public. The public themselves though rarely transgress 
the boundaries between these different events. 
 
Whilst seemingly trivial, the cola wars and loup garou examples; the distinctness of 
religious festivals; and the persistence of endogamous marriage practices on the island 
described by Nave, confirm the profound and quotidian nature of communal differences 
on the island of Mauritius. The fact that this did not break through into political discord 
in the 1970s, was a reaction to violence that had already taken place and the rise of a left-
wing movement in the MMM on the back of a wave of strike action and determinedly 
advocating a politics of class. The accession of the MMM to power in 1982, however, 
proved to be a debacle, as the party split due to a conflict of personalities between the 
MMM leader, Paul Berenger and the Primeminister, Aneerood Jugnauth, who formed his 
own Hindu majority party, the Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien. Communal voting 
patterns then re-emerged in the election of 1983, with the MMM being forced into 
opposition: despite winning a majority of votes, the distribution allowed them one third 
of the seats. Since then an uneasy truce on the communal front has emerged and coalition 
government has prevailed, though only with the backing of repressive Industrial 
Relations Legislation (limiting the power of the MMM), and the 1970 Public Order Act 
and subsequent enactments, which prohibit the publication of seditious, communal and 
libelous articles (broadly defined) in magazines and newspapers. There is also 
considerable political influence over the activities of courts of law – inhibiting the 
prosecution of cases (such as in the defence of the Catholic Confessional Schools) that 
might provoke communal tension. In many ways, the situation is comparable to that in 
Bengal, where the rise of the Communist Party of India (M) in the 1960s, a radical but 
highly pragmatic party (after the Naxalite debacle of 1971), has maintained order in what 
was formerly was one of the most communally divided parts of India. The current peace 
in Mauritius is arguably a mere simulacrum of the harmony spoken of in the tourist 
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brochures, and it most probably prevails despite rather than because of its colonial 
constitutional and electoral system, and in part due to persistent pressure from the 
socialist left. More recently still, the sheer prosperity of the island has tended to divert 
attention away from politics altogether and into the business of making money. 
 
The issue of spatial segregation in the construction of social difference is emphasised in 
Michael Twaddle’s account of the development of communalism in East Africa. He 
particularly takes issue with historians such as Robert Gregory [1993] and Prem Bhatia 
[1973], and East African Asian activists such as Yash Ghai who have pointed to ‘Asian 
exclusivity’ as a major cause of communal tensions in East Africa. They are describing 
effects as causes, he argues, and communalism had not always been a feature of East 
African society. Zanzibar had always been a major entrepot for Indian Ocean trade, but 
despite the importance of their contribution, the numbers of Asians in East Africa were 
always limited, and the majority Muslim, up until the 1890s. The migration of South 
Asians did not really begin to take off until the completion of the Mombasa railway at the 
beginning of the twentieth century opened up trading opportunities in the interior 
[Seidenberg 1996]. The British made a point of recruiting Indians (particularly 
Ramagharian Sikhs) to run the railway, and growing numbers of South Asians, mostly 
traders from Gujarat, began to arrive, although their numbers never exceeded 1.5 to 2% 
of the population of the East African protectorates. Social estrangement only began as 
British officials insisted upon residential segregation in the small towns of eastern and 
northern Uganda. Segregation was imposed here though upon racial rather than religious 
grounds, and it was race therefore that became the basis for subsequent conflict. The 
effects of urban segregation were then further compounded by a policy, underlined by the 
Devonshire Declaration of 1923, which excluded East African Asians both from rights of 
equal representation and from rural landholding  in African as well as white-settler 
controlled areas throughout the region. The effect was what Twaddle calls ‘urban 
imprisonment’ for south asian capital in East Africa, which for want of outlets elsewhere, 
was increasingly exported abroad when it could not be invested within the South Asian 
community. Undoubtedly this practice built upon habits of capital accumulation and 
circulation for example amongst the Gujarati population within India [e.g. Pocock 1973], 
but the segregation imposed upon the East African Asian population was extreme, and 
the social consequences were equally exaggerated. Evidence for the phenomenon is seen 
in population statistics provided by Gregory [1993, p.17] who states that prior to 
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independence  49% of Asians in Kenya lived in Nairobi, 36% of Asians in Tanganyika 
were based in Dar es Salaam, and 27% of Ugandan Asians lived in Kampala, the rest 
being found scattered among the other major cities.  The restriction of immigration by the 
British after 1944 finally, inhibited the development of an ‘Asian’ working class to 
parallel the successful petty bourgeoisie, and the racial stereotype of the acquisitive, 
conservative middle class  Asian community was therefore soon complete. Even then, 
Twaddle argues, there was nothing inevitable about the persecution of the Asian 
community from the early 1970’s onwards. despite their obvious differences Africans and 
Asians lived in harmony for or many years and in many ways the history of South Asian 
communities in East Africa could have turned out very differently. 
 
[INSERT additional section here on the ‘twice migrants’ ? ] 
 
The issue of segregation could not of course be anything but important in South Africa, 
but the phenomenon of apartheid was but an extreme example of a policy, linked to 
theories of racial and religious difference, that was put into practice in a variety of 
colonial situations – most obviously of course in India itself, where under policies first 
established by the East India Company, white settlers were excluded from farming but in 
the port cities, mines and plantations the Europeans were given a privileged position, 
Indian capital on the other hand being largely restricted to rural moneylending for much 
of the nineteenth century. In every case it was not the migration itself that caused 
problems, but rather the way in which it was managed by colonial and postcolonial 
regimes. In South Africa, unlike in East Africa, there was an Indian working class created 
by a significant population of indentured labourers, brought in between 1860 and 1911. 
Debates about segregation and repatriation though began in the 1870s, much earlier than 
in East Africa, partly due to the numbers of the labouring migrants, but also because of 
the economic success of many Indians vis-à-vis the local white traders. Like John Kelly, 
Ravi Thiara emphasises that although they may have been collectively constructed by 
others as ‘coolies’, ‘Arabs’ or ‘Asiatics’, the migrants themselves were a highly diverse 
group: 70% Hindu, but only 19 per cent Hindi-speaking. Regardless of their class, gender 
or religion, however, the Indians were subjected to the same institutionalised racist 
policies, and at the end of the nineteenth century Mahatma Gandhi helped begin the 
development  of a united Indian identity in response to this discrimination and the South 
African Indian Congress was born. Co-operation between Indians and Africans began in 
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1947 however with the so-called ‘Doctor’s Pact’. This was followed soon after however 
by the 1949 Durban riots, in which were amongst the victims of violence primarily 
provoked by falling real wages amongst African workers. Rather than causing the 
government to question its racists policies however, such incidents merely persuaded it to 
re-affirm them, and the Durban riots were cited as pretext for the introduction of the 
Group Areas Act in 1950, which segregated the ‘communities’, as defined by the 
government, in urban areas and became one of the main pillars of apartheid. Indians were 
especially affected by this legislation, and lost a great deal of land, especially in Natal. A 
consequence was a growing social separation of Africans and Indians, making co-
operation and understanding greatly more difficult to achieve.  Indian opposition to these 
policies was explicit. The South African Congress rejecting the Department of Indian 
Affairs set up in 1962, refusing to be represented in such a fashion, and calling for the 
creation of non-racial government departments, and there was a spectacularly successful 
organised boycott of the 1983 elections. Comparisons were made with the 1937 elections 
in India, organised within the communal framework of the 1935 Government of India 
Act, and in 1984 a United Democratic Front was established between the A.N.C. and 
I.N.C. in an attempt to overcome racial barriers. Endemic violence though has been the 
principal legacy of apartheid, and to this day South African Indians are left with a desire 
to integrate but a continuing sense of fear and beleagurement. After decades of resisting 
racial segregation some respond ironically by re-affirming their ‘Indian’ identity and by 
building new links with the Indian subcontinent. South Africa has thus become a fruitful 
fund-raising and recruiting ground for organisations such as the Santanan Dharm  and the 
B.J.P. The democratic government’s response, in its rhetoric of ‘rainbowism’, Thiara 
points out, has arguably done as much to emphasis as to emoliate the weal of racial 
segregation. 
 
Links with the ‘homeland’ and associated myths of origin often play a large part in 
identity formation amongst migrant communities, even though, or perhaps because, as 
Kelly and Thiara have point out, the actual origins of Indians living overseas can be 
highly diverse. The experience of migration itself, and secondly any racism to which they 
are subjected by the indigenous population, are often all that migrants have in common. 
A selective ‘remembering’ of the culture and traditions of home is therefore frequently 
employed to build a sense of community. There is nothing unusual in this, since every 
population in the world has at some time or other migrated from somewhere else, and 
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myths of origin are an important part of nationalism and the creation of national identities 
the world over. These myths, and the migration experience itself, however, play a varying 
degree of importance in different cultures. The English have a particular fixation with the 
idea that they are in some senses ‘superior’ to other races because their borders are 
secure, their population constant, and their history therefore ‘continuous’. This has made 
the experiences of migrants to the U.K. often very difficult. More than in most other 
societies they are expected to ‘adapt’, and determined efforts are made to facilitate this 
process. The reality of course is very different. The so-called ‘English’ culture is a 
congerie of Celtic, Pict, Angle, Saxon, Viking, Norman, Asian, Caribbean, Polish, Italian, 
Huguenot, French, East European and of course American cultures, and of the different 
gender biases within each. By selecting from this mélange however, a set of ideas is 
upheld that somehow enshrines the ‘exceptionalism’ that is held to be ‘English’.7  This 
process of selection first began several centuries ago, and still goes on (there is nothing 
fixed or eternal about it at all). For others, however, the compulsion to develop a sense of 
a ‘national’ culture has emerged more recently. In the case of Sri Lanka, Nira 
Wickramasinghe maintains, the process only began with the advent of colonialism, which 
occupies an important place in her comprehensive and convincing account of the 
emergence of a ‘Sinhala’ identity.8 
 
The population of Sri Lanka, like any other, was highly diverse. However, the origins of 
the island’s inhabitants did not become an important issue until British scholars began to 
speculate about it in the late nineteenth century and to devise hierarchical classifications 
of various groups according to the historical period in which they are supposed to have 
come. The Aryan theory of Indo-European origins was a particularly important challenge. 
As Wickramasinghe explains: ‘in pre-colonial Sri Lanka the notion of Arya existed, but 
Aryan was.. a status obtainable through the performance of meritorious acts’. British 
physical anthropologists by contrast believed it to be a racial category, enabling the 
differentiation of the South Asian population into discrete racial groups. A key moment 
in Sri Lanka, Wickramasinghe suggests, was the translation of the Mahavamsa epic into 
Sinhalese in the early twentieth century by W. Geiger. This assisted Sinhalese academics, 
such as K.N. Dharmapala, who linked together colonial racial classifications with the tale 
of Vijaya’s landing on the island in the 6th century B.C., thus providing the myth of a 
common, superior, Aryan origin for the Sinhalese people. This was far more appealing 
than depicting them as the descendants of the hordes of the demon-king Ravana (as 
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depicted in the Ramayana), or any of the many other popular mythic theories of origin 
that abounded at the time. 
 
The Vijayan myth captured people’s imagination and became the kernel of Sinhalese 
nationalism. At the same time the identity of migrants was defined as everything ‘un-
Vijayan’ by Buddhist revivalists and Sinhalese nationalists such Anagarika Dharmapala, 
who were attempting to build community consciousness in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. Under the strains the great depression, this negative way defining 
Sinhalese nationalism bore fateful fruit in violent encounters between unemployed 
Sinhalese and groups of migrant workers. Altogether these developments added 
considerable significance to attempts by the British to devise a constitution for Sri Lanka 
(or ‘Ceylon’ as it was then known), based upon their simplistic system of racial 
classification. The very first scheme was announced in 1909. Demands for the 
abandonment of communal representation were rejected, and official representatives were 
in the majority, but there were elected representatives introduced for the Europeans, the 
‘Burghers’, and ‘Educated’ Ceylonese (including Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims). It was 
always one of the ‘poshest’ constitutions: the qualification to vote in these three elections 
being a pass in a Senior Cambridge Board English Examination, masculinity (of course), 
and an income of Rs. 1500 per annum. Only 1.8 per cent being therefore eligible to vote. 
In 1921 the franchise was then greatly widened by allowing a pass in a vernacular 
examination to count.  
 
The Donoughmore commission promised the next major reform in 1928. Sri Lanka was a 
relatively prosperous, well educated and egalitarian society, however, and this presented 
a problem. The franchise must still be a privilege, the granting of which would earn the 
loyalty of colonial subjects if it was to serve any purpose. Donoughmore proposed 
therefore a universal adult suffrage, but restricted it to those who could meet a test of 
residence for more than five years, and who affirmed a willingness to remain and 
permanently settle on the island. The issue of the various migratory origins of Sri Lanka’s 
population suddenly became a crucial part of the definition of civic rights, and a sharp 
boundary was created, Wickramasinghe argues, between the Sinhalese, and more recent 
migratory inhabitants of the island – particularly the Tamil workers on the colonial tea 
plantations in the highlands. As if this were not enough, middle class Sinhalese 
nationalists demanded further restrictions including the retention of a specific literacy test 
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(thereby excluding most Indian workers, as well as many Ceylonese). These were 
accepted, as well as a clause allowing the vote to anyone who met a property 
qualification, thus enfranchising every European and the richest Indians. More positively, 
attempts to restrict the franchise of women were given up (Indian women by contrast did 
not get the vote until more than 20 years later), but in other respects the Donoughmore 
constitution was a divisive affair, extending the suffrage exclusively on a simplistic basis 
of  class and ethnicity.  Unsurprisingly, class and ethnicity (more than religion, the key 
feature in Indian constitutional arrangements in the 1930s) have remained the principal 
points of fracture in Sri Lankan public life ever since, and anti-immigrant violence was a 
feature in the run up to the 1936 Council Elections. Perhaps still more significantly, 
Wickramasinghe argues that anti-immigration legislation seemed to many more the 
sensible and legitimate way forward to deal with the strains on the economy. Sri Lanka 
thus subsequently introduced stringent restrictions on immigration long before they were 
even thought of in the U.K. This process of exclusion became yet more virulent in 
subsequent decades, spawning the Tamil-Sinhalese civil war that presently divides the 
island. 
 
Processes of prescription and exclusion are prominent as well in the management of 
ethnic boundaries by the government in colonial Malaysia, discussed in this volume by 
Amarjit Kaur. There was also a spatial separation of ethnic groups, every bit as 
pronounced as the East and South Africa. Encouragement was given furthermore to a 
distinct vocational segmentation of the workforce along ethnic lines. The process of 
identity construction amongst the Indian ‘coolie’ migrants who came to work on the 
sugar, coffee and rubber plantations and government undertaking in the nineteenth 
century began with their definition by the colonial authorities vis-à-vis their Malayan and 
Chinese counterparts. Despite this, many became thoroughly ‘Malayan’ in outlook, and 
where they looked to India for inspiration, it was ‘South Indianness’ (whence a large 
proportion of the migrants came) more than anything else, which became a hall-mark of 
the Indian community. 
 
Initially, Indian emigration to Malaysia was controlled by a few private recruiting firms, 
who were able to charge a high level of commission.9 For this reason the colonial 
government stepped in to plan and direct mass Indian migration. Indian labour was 
preferred because of its alleged docility, a perception probably related to its low cost, 
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poverty, lack of unionisation and greater dependence on the employer. This was in 
contrast to the ‘surely’ Malayan workers who, if they didn’t like the working conditions, 
could more easily go home, or the ‘industrious’ Chinese who were better organised and 
were more commonly paid on a work-related basis, rather than a fixed wage.10 These 
stereotypes strengthened the case for further Indian immigration, the main purpose and 
effect of which was to depress wages. The truth of this is shown in the frequent and 
hardly credible appeals by plantations owners for more indentured labourers on the 
grounds of ‘labour shortage’, whilst simultaneously complaining of the desertion of 
labourers to Chinese enterprises where the pay was better. It was the iron laws of supply 
and demand to which they objected, not the availability of local labour. A further 
problem was the monopolisation of Chinese immigration by the Chinese enterprises, 
especially tin mining. The colonial authorities could not easily access or control this 
market, yet the Chinese entrepreneurs were major rivals to the Europeans. For this 
problem indentured Indian labour was the favoured solution, and after the abolition of 
indenture the kangani system, recruitment by returnee migrants (in exchange for a 
commission) was followed up until 1938, a similar system to that adopted in other 
colonial plantation economies, including Mauritius [Carter 1995]. In place of the 
indenture contract the kangani recruit was tied to his employer by debt, an equally 
powerful instrument, and the workers were housed in guarded compounds close to the 
plantations, with the kangani acting as an overseer or foreman. The workers were 
unskilled when recruited, and schooling and training was completely unknown until the 
1930s, when the government was pressured into giving some grants for education (which 
did not though advance beyond the age of six). For this reason the Indian labourers, 
whilst a minority, were also always less mobile, were largely confined to rural districts, 
and were to be found in the lowest paid and lowest status occupations, even after the end 
of World War II. Prejudices against them were compounded by the fact that they were 
treated, and regarded, as transients, despite the growing numbers of second and third 
generation Indo-Malaysians resident by the 1930s. 
 
An additional problem faced by the Indian migrants was their poor gender balance. 
Unlike in Mauritius, employers felt no urgent necessity to develop a viable self-
sustaining local population of Indians, fewer women were therefore recruited, and the 
Indians were far slower to develop communities than, for example, the immigrant 
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Chinese, who by 1945 accounted for 45 per cent of the population against the Indian 10 
per cent.  
 
Amarjit Kaur argues that it was relatively late in the day that the Indian migrants began to 
organise and develop the sort of solidarity commonly seen amongst Chinese workers, and 
initially at least the initiative for  political representation came from urban Indians, who 
had little in common with the plantation workers. Arguably though self-assertion was 
already present on the plantations, its existence simply being suppressed and ignored by 
the hegemonic racial discourse of colonialism. Sabotage, false compliance, desertion and 
heavy drinking, were all commonplace in the plantations in the late  nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, all of which could be regarded as forms of resistance to the brutality 
of working conditions, although this usually was unrecognised. Thus in 1912 a riot on a 
Penang plantation was blamed without further enquiry on the ethnic origin of the 
workforce who were described as ‘an exceptionally bad class of labourer’ [Ramaswamy, 
1992, p. 102].  
 
The earliest Indian Association in Malaysia was founded in 1906. These were generally 
‘loyal’ middle class organisations. The 1920’s however saw a remarkable rise in working 
class Indian consciousness, resulting in a wave of strikes - most notably those of 1927 in 
the railways depots and other public works, and in 1937-40 on the Penang waterfront, to 
the extent that the British resorted to using troops to control the pickets [Sandhu, 1993]. 
By far the largest strike was that in the Batu Arang Colliery in 1937, which saw Indian 
workers joining with Chinese in protest. Most of these strikes were successful: for 
example in 1938 when European planters imposed a uni-lateral wage cut on Indian 
workers, mass striking won wage concessions. Furthermore, whilst few Indians joined the 
Malayan Communist Party, the growth in striking fostered a link between Indians and the 
trade unions, in particular the General Labour Union, which played a prominent role in 
post-war politics.  
 
Self-assertion can also be seen in the growth of a Dravidian revivalist movement opposed 
to caste prejudice (important, since one third of the Tamil migrants came from 
untouchable castes), and a reform movement promoting the education of the younger 
generation [Arasaratnam 1970, 1993]. As ‘Dravidianism’ became a force within the ranks 
of the Malayan Indian Congress it increasingly found a following among rural Indians. 
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And although there was support for the (predominantly north Indian) Indian National 
Congress, and especially for Bose’s Indian National Army during World War II, there 
was also a cultural and political distance, highlighted by Jawaharlal Nehru, who on a visit 
in 1950 urged the Indians to think less of India and to do more to contribute to Malaysian 
national life. This encouraged the M.I.C. to develop ties with other Malayan political 
parties, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Malayan Chinese 
Association (MCA), with whom they formed a united front to contest the federal  
elections in 1955. Thus the qualities of ‘unIndianness’ within the I.M.C., much as with 
the South African Indian Congress, facilitated the creation of alliances with indigenous 
political parties – a remarkable outcome in the light of the segregationary practices of the 
colonial regime. In the wake of the violence of the Malaysian Communist insurgency in 
the early 1950s, and ethnic riots in 1969, the need for unity remained an important feature 
on the political agenda in independent Malaysia. It is only since independence 
furthermore that religion has become a divisive issue, the ‘Islamicisation’ of the 
Malaysian nation, provoking anxiety amongst indigenous Chinese and Hindus. Given 
past precedents, Kaur implies, there are grounds for optimism that the cause of these 
anxieties may be overcome, yet ethnicity, in-built as it was in the very framework of the 
economy, is likely to remain an important line of fissure in the Malaysian body politic.  
 
A space for Indians within Malaysian society is being created, but it is probably as much 
a process of recognising the positive developments that have already taken place as it is a 
matter of hopes for the future. The recovery of another voice, that of Indian females in 
Caribbean society, is the concern of Samita Chatterjee’s paper. All too often she argues 
traditional historical scholarship has focussed on public sphere activities, overlooking or 
simply ignoring the vitality of the private sphere. The private sphere though plays an 
important role, Chatterjee, argues, in reinventing an imagined space and locale, 
particularly in cases of exile and resettlement. As Clifford has argued ‘Life for women in 
diasporic situations can be doubly painful – struggling with the material and spiritual 
insecurities of exile, with the demands of family and work, and with the demands of old 
and new patriarchies’ [1997, p.259]. Within the private sphere female spaces are 
therefore especially important sites of contestation and they can be arenas of 
empowerment and identity affecting the entire community.  Historically however the 
stereotyping of indentured Indian women in the Caribbean and elsewhere has been 
extremely negative, the women who travelled on independent contracts of work often 
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being depicted as ‘immoral, streetwise prostitutes’. Oral sources however suggest very 
different and far more positive roles for women, as story-tellers, and transmitters of 
culture, language and folk-lore, as well as bread-earners for their families. In this role, 
Chatterjee suggests, women could be highly inventive: merging and generating new 
traditions in order to help build a sense of community.11 As evidence of this she refers to 
Muslim marriage ceremonies, in which Indian women took a leading role as organisers, 
and which contained not only the traditional nikah ceremony with the Imam presiding, 
but elements of singing and dancing which were clearly borrowed from Hindu rituals. 
Such exchanges of religious ritual and practices were common, and in Trinidad in the 
days of indenture, and even into contemporary times it is not unusual to find persons with 
different religious leanings as members of the same family. Immigrant culture was  
commonly syncretic, as Indian immigrants occupied a narrow space on the border 
between the white plantations and black peasant societies. Improvisation and creativity, 
as well as the maintenance of tradition, were therefore necessary for survival. Today 
these informal gestures have given way to more formal attempts to develop a national 
culture. And the discourse on women since the end of indenture has turned to 
emphasising the character of ‘the ideal woman’ based on an imagined and invented purity 
of a ‘classical Indian culture and patriarchy’. Remembering the innovative role of women 
in the early days of migration Chatterjee argues, can play an important role in shaping the 
form and content of these struggles. Her paper also suggests that inquiries into identity 
formation can proceed at various levels and using a variety of sources, of which often we 
investigate but a few: private and female spaces being most commonly amongst those 
omitted. 
 
A more paradoxical case, of post-Partition migration within the Indian subcontinent, is 
addressed by Karen Leonard and Mohammad Waseem. Leonard and Wash examine the 
fate of the so-called ‘Mohajirs’ – urdu speaking Muslims from Hyderabad the north of 
India who settled in the new state of Pakistan after 1947. Ostensibly one might have 
though that Islam being the basis of the new state all Muslim migrants from India would 
be equally welcome and integrated more or less on the same basis. The papers by 
Leonard and Waseem however demonstrate that psychological responses and outcomes 
of migration can vary greatly depending on the material and social circumstances. Before 
1971 Mohajirs constituted about 10 per cent of Pakistan’s population, but after the break-
away of Bangladesh in 1971 this rose to 20 per cent. Many arrived as refugees in 1947 or 
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soon after, but throughout the 1960’s, ‘70s and ‘80s their numbers were increased by 
cross-border marriages with Muslims remaining on the Indian side. Those who migrated 
from Punjab to Pakistan integrated quite successfully, but those who came from further 
afield, from Bihar and north India, or the former independent princely state of 
Hyderabad, had more difficulties 
 
The label ‘Mohajir’, Karen Leonard points out, is a value-laden term, evoking the escape 
or exile of the prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina. She investigates these 
meanings and many other aspects of the migratory experience using historical sources 
and the richly evocative and important resource of oral interviews conducted with 
migrants from all walks of life over the course of several years.12 Some Mohajirs she 
spoke with took great pride in their migrant identity, pointing out their elective choice to 
live in Pakistan, rather than the fact that they were merely borne there. Others however, 
and especially the migrants from Hyderabad, were uncomfortable with the label, 
preferring to preserve their identity as Hyderabadis, or to integrate themselves as 
Pakistanis – an attempt which is not always welcomed. Integration has been made more 
difficult by the Pakistani government’s practice of enumerating them in the census as a 
separate ethnic group, a practice which has encouraged Mohajirs to regard themselves in 
this light  Hyderabadis were often highly educated and as migrants, like other Mohajirs, 
tended to be economically successful. This has fuelled a great deal of prejudice against 
them, and against which they have reacted, all of which Leonard describes. Despite this, 
the Hyderabadis have remained relatively apolitical and have kept their distance from the 
Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), preferring, apparently, anonymity rather than 
association with an organisation increasingly known latterly for its militancy and 
violence. More seriously, they reason that representing Mohajirs as an ethnic group 
demanding a territorial base cannot but end in disappointment and defeat.  Instead, many 
are opting out and attempting to escape the Mohajir identity: ‘they have transformed their 
identities in other ways, ways different from each other and ways which are more 
promising for themselves and for Pakistan’. This they can achieve through marriage, or 
by adopting a regional or metropolitan culture already extant.  Thus, rather like Kelly’s 
Indo-Fijian’s, many Hyderabadi Mohajirs apparently choose anonymity and self-
effacement, rather than representing themselves as any sort of migrant, if this means 




Mohammed Waseem traces the Mohajir ‘problem’ from its inception pointing out how 
many Mohajirs sought to identify the Pakistani nation with the wider Islamic world, 
interpreting the two-nation theory as giving the Indian Muslims the right to emigrate to 
Pakistan and ignoring provincial loyalties within the country. By these ideological means 
Mohajirs made a place for themselves within the new state, the unity of which was highly 
important to them. This all started to come apart after 1970 when the rise of regionalism 
split the western and eastern halves of Pakistan apart. ‘Territorial nationalism pushed 
aside ideological nationalism as the dominant mode of thinking’ and in West Pakistan the 
Indus valley and Punjabi origins of Pakistani civilization were increasingly emphasised, 
at the expense of Indo-Muslim civilization, thereby marginalising the Mohajirs. 
Simultaneously the accession to power of the Pakistani People’s Party in Western 
Pakistan, a populist party committed to the goal of preserving Sindhi culture against the 
perceived onslaught of Mohajirs ‘spelt doom for the cherished world view of the migrant 
elite rooted in a unitarian model of politics.’  In response to the popular four cultures 
identification of Pakistan – Sindhi, Punjabi, Baluch and Pakhtun – Mohajirs then felt 
entitled to create their own sub-nationalism, centred in Karachi and Sindh. Interestingly 
although they inevitably became rivals, this rivalry did not preclude the possibility of co-
operation between the MQM and PPP against the even greater threat from upcountry 
Baluchs and Pakhtun migrants in Karachi, against whom they formed an electoral 
alliance in 1988. This alliance was however a brief lived phenomenon, and relationships 
between the MQM and PPP in Sindh have been marked ever since by violence, terrorism 
and periodical interventions by the military in an attempt to restore order. Most recently 
the MQM have common to agreements with the Nawaz Sharif governments and have 
formed coalition governments in Islamabad and Karachi, indicating a move away from 
violent confrontation. Ethnic sub-nationalism seems likely to remain the entrenched 
position of the organisation however for some years to come.13 
 
The interesting paradox of the ethnic nationalism of Mohajirs in Pakistan, as described by 
Mohammed Waseem, is that it is a non-elite movement, which is not built upon a 
primordial association with the land. It is a curious example, though not so far removed 
from others we have seen, of the rise of an ethnic community on the basis of not 
belonging to the well-defined and pre-existing communities of the region. Waseem 
further emphasises that in explaining its rise we ought not over-emphasise the role of the 
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state, as in Pakistan, as in many other third world countries, ‘the state's policies do not 
incorporate large sectors of public and private activity where patterns of interaction at the 
local level create new interpersonal, inter-sectoral and inter-ethnic conflicts’.  The 
classical theories concerning the formation of ethnic nationalism, the primordialist and 
the instrumentalist (as defined by Brass), in which the state and elite competition play an 
important role, do not therefore exactly fit. Instead, a whole series of complex changes, 
ranging from the Afghanistan war to indigenous revival in Punjab and Sindh, as well as 
sectoral and demographic changes, appear to be responsible for the rise of Mohajir 
nationalism.11  
 
The case of the Mohajirs is thus influenced by a variety of internal and external factors, 
and perhaps well illustrates the need for a ‘fuzzier’ approach to the history of 
communities and the shaping of nationalist movements, as Partha Chatterjee and John 
Kelly have argued. Equally interesting is the fact that at any point Mohajir-Sindhi rivalry 
might well have been averted. The whole issue arose not as a result of the activities of the 
state, but due to its inactivities, and its failure on several counts to secure the legal rights 
of individuals and property. Ethnicity therefore only emerged as an alternative basis on 
which to defend these interests once the Pakistani state had proven itself insufficient to 
the task. 
 
The role of ‘external’ factors  in identity formation is further highlighted in Thomas 
Hanson’s anthropological account of ‘migrant culture’ in contemporary Bombay, 
although the focus of his paper is not on the migrants so much as those left behind., and 
the impact that remittances and the returnee migrants have on the culture ‘at home’. The 
home in question is Nagpada, a densely populated low-income neighbourhood adjoining  
large mill-district in central Bombay where Hanson stayed between 1996 and 1997. 
Hanson’s purpose is to identify the affects of ‘globalization’ and of ‘global horizons’ on 
the world view of this local community, but as a ‘community’ he points out that it as 
many diverse elements. Muslims in Bombay are not a homogenous group. The oldest 
Muslim residents of Bombay are the small, wealthy trading families of Bohras, Khojas 
and Memons who have a centuries old tradition of migration in and around the Indian 
Ocean region. There is a primary contradiction between these older, religiously deviant 
groups, and later migrants from the north of India, the heartland of Indo-Muslim 
tradition, who came to work in the cotton mills and other industries in the 1920s. They 
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included unemployed weavers (ansaris) amongst their number. These U.P.ites were 
preceeded by migrants from the Konkan and Deccan, and followed by migrants from 
South India, and from impoverished Bihar – an inward flow that continues to this day. 
Linguistically and culturally these Muslims were poles apart, but Hanson argues, the 
notion of a Muslim community has been forced upon them by the assertion of aggressive 
Hindu politics since the mid- 1980s, and especially since the anti-Muslim riots in the city 
in 1993. A process of that might be called ‘negative assimilation’ might therefore be said 
to have taken place, Muslims of various backgrounds throwing in their lot together owing 
to the breakdown of relations with neighbouring Hindus, and for reasons of self-defence. 
The creation of a single Muslim community has also been generated more simply by the 
burning and destruction of outlying Muslim suburbs within Hindu majority areas. This 
has forced refugees into the largely Muslim quarters and has created a clearer spatial 
segregation of Hindus and Muslims within the city than has ever existed before. Hanson 
also argues that a sense of unity has also been generated by the practice of the police and 
state authorities treating the Muslims as a unified security problem and collective threat 
to civic order. 
 
Interestingly, and perhaps encouragingly, Hanson did not, however, find that their fraught 
relationships with neighbouring Hindus was necessarily the most important element in 
Muslim identity formation. Within the Muslim community there are movements of 
purification and religious revivalism, which are inward looking or have developed 
primarily with reference to wider currents within Islam. Hindus not taken seriously as a 
threat, being regarded as the mere paws of ‘big society’, the Government, the Congress or 
even the U.S.A.  Instead, the most important force in local identity formation appeared to 
be what Hanson describes as ‘the local hierarchies of status and power’. These 
hierarchies include religious leaders, social workers (dada’s) and local politicians. But 
within these local hierarchies of power, the rise of a lucrative migrant stream for the 
purposes of labouring abroad, primarily in the middle east, also plays an important role. 
Those with family members abroad, or who themselves have worked abroad, enjoy a 
prosperity and status, or at least a status, within the local identity-economy, that can 
exceed even that of the ‘old’ Bombay, or the more successful labouring families who 
have nonetheless stayed at home. Travel to the middle east in particular, the birth-place of 
Islam, even if no trip to Mecca is involved, is considered an act of great heroism and to 
be like an on-going Haj: a source of erudition and education denied to those who have 
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stayed at home. By travel, Hanson argues, Muslim Bombayites affirm their membership 
of a global Muslim civilization and uphold Muslim claims to be cosmopolitan ‘men of 
the world’. To substantiate this status., Hanson discovered many if his ex-migrant 
informants to be great raconteurs, peddling tales of their experiences far more impressive 
than the reality. Recurrent myths of the wealth of Muslims in the middle east, and the 
depravity of Western, Christian civilisation were often expounded as well. This ‘world 
view’ seemed to many far important that denouncing local Hindu politicans, or even their 
Hindu neighbours, with whom they only lately been they had been bloodily at war. 
 
The economic impact of migration, even though it is now on the decline, is an important 
part of the status effect, as the families of returning migrants often enjoyed far more 
independence. However, unlike with the Bangladeshi migrants studied by Gardener 
[1995], amongst whom the ‘londoni’ families with relatives in Britain and the Gulf 
enjoyed unusual influence and prestige (often becoming and being considered more 
‘devout’ Muslims as a consequence), migration for Bombay-wallahs is clearly not the 
only means to material advancement. Nonetheless, migrant families can usually afford a 
variety of status goods, including better education for their children (in English medium, 
and at the Madrassah for Koranic studies), and the Haj itself, which is often denied to 
their neighbours. This can greatly increase not only their material but their religious 
standing. Hanson ends his study by concluding: ‘The Muslims in Bombay are today 
clearly in search of recognition, not necessarily from Hindus, nor from the forces of 
Hindu nationalism whom they refuse to recognise as their ‘others’ in spite of the fact 
that these movements rule both city and state’. 
 
The positive aspect of the Bombay example is that it suggests that Hindu-Muslim 
identities may not perhaps been fashioned in India in opposition to one another during 
the past century to the extent suggested in many academic studies [e.g. Van der Veer, 
1996]. There has undoubtedly been much violence between Muslims and Hindus in 
India during the 1980s and 1990s, and the very real threat of war between India and 
Pakistan hangs over the continent. Nonetheless, the framework of a rigid racial division 
of labour (by caste, tribe ethnicity or religion), unequal representation, and political 
manipulation imposed by colonial regimes in the early part of this century, the 
antinomies of nationalism post independence, simple economic competition in more 
recent decades, and the pressures of globalization, have all played a part. These might all 
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be considered wholly exogenous and contingent factors, subject to change and not 
everywhere having the same effect, or the same response: a point that is shown in the 
great variety in processes of identity formation, many of them not as confrontational as 
one might suppose, highlighted by the papers in this volume. 
 
The final contribution to this volume, by Aminah Mohammed, presents a situation still 
further removed from the classical circumstance of Hindu-Muslim rivalry within the 
Indian sub-continent. Or so it might seem at first glance. After all, is not the U.S.A. the 
most modern of societies, certainly the most prosperous, and by its constitution, 
theoretically egalitarian and liberal? The reality of course is that the U.S. is not in every 
instance a melting pot that subsumes identities, but a nation that imposes an additional 
abstract loyalty, to the flag and constitution14, upon them. The U.S. may be extremely 
prosperous, but it is also one of the most economically competitive, unequal and (one 
must say) violent of societies. Where competition is rife, self-defence through the 
development of communities, community solidarity and extended family relations will 
be conspicuous. Unsurprisingly, therefore, identification through association, whether it 
be the West Richmond angling society, Latino-American political organisations, gangs, 
nationwide lobbies, or religion is probably more pronounced in the U.S.A. than in any 
other society. It even enjoys semi-official sanction, as for example at the Los Angeles 
Festival of 1991 [described in Clifford, 1997, p. 258], and it is only held in check by 
what Aminah Mohammed refers to as an ideology of civic religion, or ‘idolatrous 
nationalism’. One ought also emphasis within this the phenomenon of American 
individualism, especially pronounced among the middle classes, which also abounds and 
holds in check the range and scope of associations15. Hence one encounters paradoxes 
such as Waco fundamentalists abandoning their families, and giving themselves and all 
they possess to a highly disciplined ‘community’ in pursuit of spiritual and material 
freedom – a phenomenon only elsewhere encountered amongst the long-since declined 
monastic orders of Europe and Asia. Within this context wholly new and different sets 
of pressures impinge upon immigrant groups of Asians 
 
Migrants from South Asia first began to arrive in the U.S.A. in considerable numbers in 
the 1960s following a liberalisation of immigration policies. Today there are more than a 
million, and since immigration policy has been biased towards the educated and 
qualified, they have been among the more successful of America’s citizens. Aminah 
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Mohammed makes the point that although the United States is officially a secular 
country, its interpretation of secularism, whilst separating State and religion, enjoins that 
equal respect be given to all religions (this is not far removed from the Indian idea of 
sarva dharma saramabhava). Both Muslims and Hindus in the U.S.A. are therefore given 
considerable freedom, even encouragement, in the exercise of their beliefs16. Because of 
this, and because South Asians in the U.S. are very scattered, one might imagine that, in 
this land of immigration, the relatively prosperous communities of Indians, Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis might have found a way of living with each other, a modus vivendi, far 
removed from the conflicts and tensions of the subcontinent. Mohammed concludes. 
however, that this is far from being the case. 
 
Aminah Mohammed points to a wide ranges of prejudices and the labyrinthine growth of 
associations. There are conflicts particularly over the issue of language. Urdu and Hindi 
are used as markers of difference, particularly among Muslims (for whom it can be a 
symbol of their religious devotion), and many South Asians will insist on speaking to 
other South Asians in Urdu or Hindi, regardless where there come from. Most Hindus are 
in fact from Gujarat or Punjab. A rift has thus developed between the Hindi/Urdu 
speaking North Indians and the South Indians, who never meet together in the same 
associations: ‘the controversy over the domination of Hindi thus seems to linger in the 
diaspora’. Amongst north Indians, the Hindus and Muslims meet in separate associations, 
whilst amongst Muslims, Hyderabadis and those from a Muhajir background are also to 
be found, as in modern Pakistan, to be keeping apart from one another and meeting in 
separate elite associations  
 
Mohammed highlights particularly the role of community leaders, and holds them 
responsible for much of the animosity, though arguably these rifts might still fit within 
classical instrumentalist theories of communalism. Thus to begin with, one might point 
out that prosperity is not the same thing as economic security. The U.S. is a highly 
mobile and competitive society where expectations are high. Economic opportunities 
fluctuate, albeit at a generally much higher level than in other societies, and these South 
Asian communities will inevitably at times find themselves at times as economic rivals. 
However, an interesting point about these divisions is that they are not primarily, it 
seems, religious. Any number of geographical or linguistic bases might be found for the 
creation of a new association, but Hinduism and Islam do not have a monolithic function, 
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overdetermining this process. Thus Indians will even shun Hindus from the Caribbean, 
questioning their ‘Indianness’, whilst Hindus from African origins will be accepted as 
equals. Mohammed suggests that there is probably a class dimension to this, as Indians in 
the Caribbean were usually recruited as labourers, whilst those in Africa were more 
commonly from trading classes. 
 
Amidst the mêlée of competing associations, the prospects for co-operation may seem 
limited, however Aminah Mohammed predicts that some sort of South Asian Pan-
Ethnicity will eventually emerge, comparable to that seen among Afro-Americans and 
Chinese Americans. Evidence for is to be seen already in annual events such as the Indian 
Day parades on August 15th, which are commonly attended by South Asians from every 
background - although conspicuous attempts have made to exclude gays, and some South 
Asian Muslims have occasionally boycotted the event. The prospects for a South Asian 
pan-ethnicity also seem to be strongest amongst the second and third generation offspring 
from migrant families, who culturally have more in common, not least of all the 
American language. Within the U.K., where South Asian communities have been 
established for rather longer, this development has already begun to take place. The 
principal obstacle is that lack of an appropriate vocabulary (the term ‘South Asian’ itself 
being unrecognised both by the migrant and host societies), but the English language, 
film and popular music have all provided a means of communication that transcends 
communal boundaries. Aminah Mohammed highlights in particular the contributions of 
musicians such as the late Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan, who achieved a following throughout 
South Asia and particularly among Asian communities abroad. The phenomenon of neo-
bhangra has also become a musical means of expressing South Asian identity, albeit in a 
male-dominated idiom, that is truly ‘post-colonial’, borrowing from every culture, and 
transcending ethno-religious boundaries. Examples that can be mentioned include the 
Asian Dub Foundation, Naseeb and Fun-Da-Mental, largely U.K. based bands but which 
also have a considerable following in the U.S.A. There is also of course the Bollywood 
movie industry, the stars of which enjoy a following in all parts of Asia and amongst 
every South Asian community abroad, and Pakistani bands such as Junoon, which have 
crossed the border in the opposite direction (they are now almost permanent expatriates 
owing to Pakistani censorship), winning a substantial following amongst Indian youth. In 
such ways, as Clifford [1997] and Bhabha [1990] have argued, old and new diasporas can 





From one point of view a South Asian pan-identity does not need to be discovered, so 
much as RE-discovered. There are those who would maintain that such an identity was 
present in pre-modern times [Jalal & Bose, 1998], and from the late nineteenth century 
there is evidence of high levels of mobility, and of the internationalisation of many South 
Asian migrants, from both working and middle class origins [Bates, forthcoming]. 
Arguably, pre-modern society was always more fluid: it was the colonial period itself 
which saw a rigidification of custom and occupational specialisation, and of concomitant 
identities [Bates & Carter, 1994; Washbrook 1996].17 Migration overseas was a means of 
escaping the increasingly inflexible and under-employed Indian labour market, and  
amongst those migrant workers, many had become highly cosmopolitan by the end of the 
colonial period, with Indians abroad commonly raising their status, economically and 
socially, and being 're-borne' into a world free of caste, if not all forms of 
discrimination.18 In the process new identities were constructed to enable them to bridge 
the gap between the old and the new worlds and to maintain their links with both.  Sadly, 
the legacy of conflict immediately before, during and after the decolonisation process, 
has commonly marred the relationship between South Asian communities, and between 
themselves and the indigenous populations. The growth of postcolonial national identities  
has also commonly involved a process of definition by exclusion that has impacted 
negatively upon migrant groups, Sri Lanka and East Africa being here the most 
conspicuous examples.  
 
Conflict between migrants themselves and between migrants and indigenous 
communities are not caused by the migration per se, but by prevailing popular 
conceptions of racial difference. There are many examples available from history where 
such conceptions of difference do not exist, or where they nonetheless readily admit the 
incorporation of ‘outsiders’. Likewise, the identity of migrant South Asians has often 
been re-interpreted in ways that overcome social barriers commonly encountered within 
the subcontinent, as well as facilitating integrative relationships with indigenous 
populations. However, identities cannot exist in a vacuum as a product of will, nor are 
they solely created from elements drawn from identities of the past. The papers in this 
volume suggest that although the agency and inventiveness of migrants is characteristic 
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and vital, identities must be sustained and maintained by definitive structures of legal 
identification and representation. Contrarily these same structures can work as well over 
time to undermine established unities of consciousness and generate processes of 
division. The evolution of  laws, constitutions and political assemblies, and the 
segregation of communities, spatially and in their relationship to economies and the 
political process are therefore a vital part in the history of identity formation. The 
imperial legacy in all these areas has often been profound, imperial institutions 
enshrining caste, class, race and religion as the boundaries of South Asian communities 
often having had important long-term effects.  
 
There has been resistance to colonial identifications, and the evolution of communities 
and national identities has continued apace since the independence of the former colonial 
territories. An important influence has been that of globalisation, and the emergence of 
postcolonial, transnational identities [Appadurai, 1996]. But equally conspicuous has 
been the neo-nationalist response, normalising cultural traditions, and re-inventing once 
more the spiritual and moral claims of nationalism. The past half decade, in particular, 
has seen the re-institutionalisation of religious communal differences in South Asia and 
elsewhere. In India this has been seen in the resurgence of avowedly Hindu political 
organisations such as Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Shiva Sena and the Bharatiya Janata Party. 
In response to this the Indian government has shown signs of giving up its secular stance 
in favour of initiatives that harmonise church and state.  If communal forces are 
becoming politically organised, the only way this can be dealt with is by rejecting its 
presence in a secular state, or going down the road of adopting a state religion.  India has 
for some while been wavering between these two positions [Bhargava 1998], but for the 
first time, significant moves have been made in the late 1990s towards the 
institutionalisation of Hinduism itself.  These signs include the setting up of an all India 
committee of Shankacharyas to provide leadership in matters of religious dispute 
affecting the Hindu faith. Legally the state in India is committed to a secular and 
bipartisan position, although even here there are signs of this commitment wavering, with 
interference in the judiciary, undermining of the electoral commission and persistent 
abuse of the emergency constitutional power of ‘President's rule’, which has been 




Given the direction in which India is moving, and the fact that there seem at present to be 
few ominous consequences arising from the Mauritius practice of sustainable 
communalism, the question must be asked has India's secular constitution and its 
independent judiciary been more of a hindrance than an advantage in resolving 
communal differences?  Or alternatively, are countries like Mauritius treading a 
potentially hazardous tightrope?  One might conclude that the crucial factor in communal 
conflicts is not juridicable rights, since inequalities between people on the basis of 
religion and the conflicts that might arise cannot necessarily be resolved by resort to 
constitutional reforms or judicial measures when at base their source is economic or class 
based inequalities (as is often the case).  The fundamental difference remains that 
although India has guaranteed the rights of minorities in legal terms, these guarantees do 
not extend into the areas of economics and the government has failed to provide even a 
minimum of subsistence for those at the bottom of the socio-economic pile [Galanter 
1994]. Indeed latterly it has to some extent washed its hands of these responsibilities by 
embarking on a programme of liberalisation and privatisation and by dismantling its 
planning regime, albeit reluctantly, and partly at the behest of external advisers and 
authorities such as the I.M.F. The resulting upsurge in popular discontent has then been 
magnified by India’s centralised, and inflexible first-past-the-post political system. In 
Mauritius by contrast, although economic inequalities exist, minimum standards of living 
can be and have been more easily ensured thereby mitigating differences and conflicts 
between communities.  In the long term one might speculate that harmony is best ensured 
by constitutions or at least political practices that include in their definition of basic 
human rights, and are compelled to maintain in practice, a minimum of economic 
security and opportunity.  In conclusion it may be suggested that the state needs to act as 
an arbiter of economic as well as political and social conflicts. An effective democratic 
political and judicial system can go some way towards redressing emergent conflicts, but 
it is the conspicuous failure of India to address the former of those three that has perhaps 
led above all to the disintegration of its former secular consensus. Ideologically, however, 
there remains a further issue to consider, as some would argue that so-called ‘post-
colonialism’ is merely one of neo-colonialism’s new hegemonic ideological forms. Just 
as colonialism spawned national movements of liberation, so globalisation, and ‘faux’ 
post-colonialism can be said at the moment to be spawning their own neo-nationalist 
responses, intellectually and in practical terms. Whether true or not, no developing nation 
can arguably yet claim to be free from the partitions and ideological legacies of 
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colonialism, as third world debt and the continuing military stand-off between India and 
Pakistan, 50 years after independence, attest. A genuine pan-South Asian ethnicity, that 
could realistically begin to address the material and spiritual inequalities of the 
subcontinent and its satellite communities throughout the globe, may therefore be an 
ambition that awaits a different generation, and a different set of circumstances, to that of 
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